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RELATIVE CONSTRAINT AND PUBLIC REASON:
WHAT IS "THE WORK WE EXPECT OF LAW"?*
Frank I. Michelmant
I. COMFORT IN WINTER
As Steven Winter presents it in A Clearing in the
Forest,
legal decisionmaking could be characterized as relatively
constrained or (if one prefers) as moderately indeterminate. But it
would be more accurate still to say that law is indeterminate in
more-or-less predictable ways: Rarely do the legal materials provide
a single "right" answer to a legal question; but . . . legal
decisionnaking is nevertheless regular, systematic, and largely
predictable.
Not that this is a problem from any instrumental standpoint.
The mere fact of moderate indeterminacy in adjudication is,
Winter says, beside the point of whether "decisions are
sufficiently regular and predictable to do the work we expect of
law."2 As long as "processes of persuasion operate" to constrain
decisionmakers in sufficiently predictable ways, Winter offers,
"law can 'operate as law."3 In sum, it suffices to that end if
legal decisionmaking is a "relatively" constrained activity.4
Which is exactly, as Winter explains masterfully in Clearing,
what cognitive science tells us we firmly can expect legal
* @2002 Frank I. Michelman. All Rights Reserved.
t Robert Walmsley University Professor, Harvard University.1 Steven L. Winter, A Clearing in the Forest 316 (2001) [hereinafter
Clearing].
' Id. at 313.
3 Id. at 153; see id. at 313.4 Seeid. at 316.
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decisionmaking to be: relatively constrained, indeterminate to
be sure but only moderately so and within predictable bounds.
Clearing thus seems to be a work designed in part to
convey to anxious liberal jurisprudes, reeling from decades of
indeterminacy critique,' a consolatory message from cognitive
science, to wit: By force of something like laws of nature, a
certain, shared and common base of neural and cultural
predispositions makes it highly likely that processes of
persuasion among appropriately situated legal decisionmakers,
judges in particular, will "operate" to constrain their choices in
ways sufficiently predictable for law to function as law, or do
the work we expect of law.
Being myself something of an anxious liberal
jurisprude, how shall I respond to this offer of comfort? To be
provocative, let me now say that I am not sure it is a wholly
innocent offer that my friend Winter has kindly put before the
likes of me. Flashing back to some prior conversations between
the two of us, I think the offer may be meant as an enticement
to us anxious liberal jurisprudes to stop obsessing over what
we've been prone to regard as a morally pressing concern about
the legitimacy of state coercion in the name of the law.6 "The
fear," as Winter sees it, has been that the pliability of the legal
material leaves judges "free to impose their personal values"
tyrannically on the rest of us, and so his book aims to show
that "this conventional concern is greatly exaggerated."7 Now, I
would like to stop obsessing, of course (if you can believe me),
but my problem is that I am not sure Winter has accounted
fully for the grounds of liberal legitimacy-anxiety, or even
attempted to offer comfort that possibly could quell it;
although-and this will be an important part of what I wish to
say-I do think that what he has done so far carries
considerable promise of a possibly formidable future attempt,
and I mean "promise" in both of the senses that may occur to
you.
5 See, e.g., DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION (FIN DE SIkCLE) 31
(1997).
6 See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Legal Scholarship: Its Causes and Cure, 90 YALE
L.J. 1205, 1206-07 (1981).
7 CLEARING, supra note 1, at 109.
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II. LAW's WORK
My doubt about whether Clearing itself can count as
such an attempt reflects directly my inability to tell from what
Winter has written in that book exactly what work he thinks
should be included in "the work we expect of law."'
"Positive legal ordering," let us say, means an effective
social practice in which most inhabitants of a territory stand
ready, most of the time, to comply with norms of conduct
pronounced to be law there by socially recognized legal
officials-and furthermore to support the use of social force, if
necessary, to secure compliance in general with such norms.
On grounds I believe to be no less Hobbesian than they may
also be Kantian, ° political liberals uniformly affirm the moral
necessity of positive legal ordering. Roughly, we go on the
unshakeable belief that there are numerous attainable worlds
in which positive legal ordering prevails that clearly must be
better for everyone in them than any realistically conceivable
world could be from which this practice is absent. (In that
respect, one opposite to political liberalism is a principled,
thoroughgoing anarchism.)
But let us try now to be a bit more specific about the
human and social demands that we aim or expect to have
satisfied by a social practice of positive legal ordering. If we
had on the table Winter's answer to that question, we would
know better what he understands by "the work we expect of
law." And indeed we can focus the query more sharply, because
Clearing apparently shares with virtually all of the rest of
jurisprudence the perception that it is at the point of
adjudication-the point at which concrete social controversies
are submitted for ostensible decision according to law ---that
the pretensions of legal ordering to do some societal work or
other truly are put to the test. Adjudication is where the legal
rubber meets the road of life.
'Id. at 313.
9 See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN chs. 13-17 (M. Oakeshott ed., 1962) (1651).
'o See IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE § 42 (John
Ladd trans., 1999).
" But see infra Part VIII for qualification.
20021
BROOKLYN LAWREVIEW
So then what are the social needs and demands that we
aim or expect to be satisfied by a social practice of positive
legal ordering that culminates in adjudication, be it actual,
anticipated, or imagined? What, in that sense, is the work we
expect of law? For our purposes here, a rough-and-ready
answer will suffice. First, people doubtless count on the law
and its administration for a relatively stable transactional
context, one in which a multitude of diversely interested and
motivated social actors can plan and pursue their sundry
affairs and projects with reasonable foreknowledge of the
probable, relevant responses of others, including legal officials.
Second, people doubtless further look to the legal regime for a
relatively peaceful and decisive way to get specific, eruptive
social controversies resolved so that life can go on. Possibly
third, a regime-or "rule"--of law is often thought to have the
further purpose of ensuring the moral defensibility of the
exercises of force and coercion, explicit and implicit, that
political government inevitably involves within a modern
society driven by sharp and deep conflicts of interests and of
ethical vision.
There we would have three possible components of the
work we expect of law: stability, settlement, and legitimation.'
The first two items on my rough list of demands that we look to
law to help us satisfy, stability and settlement, are self-
explanatory. The arguable legitimation function of law may be
a bit more obscure-it surely is more controversial-and I will
elaborate on it below. 3 Only at the end of this Essay will I have
a word to say about law's putative expressive function and its
possible relation to the argument of Winter's book.
III. LEGITIMATION IN WINTER?
Suppose you think that stability and settlement account
fully for the work we expect of law. You, then, should readily
12 Some theorists might wish to add a fourth function for the law, that
of expressing the political community's values and through them its solidarity and
sense of identity. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 166, 168-75, 190, 225, 264
(1986); Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A
General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503 (2000). I cannot say much in this brief
essay with the "expressive" views possible relation to Professor Winter's work.
13 See infra Part V.
[Vol. 67: 4
RELATIVE CONSTRAINT AND PUBLIC REASON
accept Winter's proposition that an assurance of the relative
constraint of adjudication, of the sort that he so fascinatingly
shows us cognitive science is helping to underwrite, is all we
need for confidence that law can do its expected work. Surely
law can make highly valuable contributions toward fulfilling
society's needs for stability and settlement, even if everyone
knows that adjudicative outcomes will vary, from judge to
judge and from time to time, even in ways that can make real
differences to interested parties, as long as everyone also
knows the variations will not (except possibly very rarely) be
radical or shocking.
Now suppose for a moment that we doubt gravely
whether law's legitimation function can withstand and survive
even such a moderate indeterminacy. (I will explain soon why
we might.14) Such a doubt would leave us uncertain about
Winter's intended message regarding the alleged legitimation
function for law when he says that relative constraint suffices
for legal decisionmaking to do the work we expect of law. For
then his possibly intended message could be any one of three
we can think of, two negative and one positive. First possible
negative message: Winter might be implying that the
legitimation demand is not one that matters, nor worth caring
about at all. Second possible negative message: He might be
implying nothing about the demand's worth or importance but
only something about law's inability to handle it: "Sure,
legitimation matters," Winter might be heard as saying, "but it
isn't part of the work we expect of law, or at any rate of any
work we ought to expect of law, because, as I am engaged here
in showing, it's a demand beyond law's ability to handle, unlike
the demands for stability and settlement.""5
On a third possible construction, Winter's implication
regarding the legitimation function might be a positive,
constructive one. Although he does not discuss the matter in
Clearing, Winter may in fact stand ready to include
legitimation within the work we (rightly) expect of law, and to
14 id.
'5 Consider, for example, this passage: "When social practices and values are
controversial or in disarray, the legal rules and principles will be too.... [Wle cannot
expect the law to resolve difficult, controversial cases in a way that is different or
removed from the realm of politics." CLEARING, supra note 1, at 328-29. I return to this
passage below in Part VII.
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uphold, against the sort of doubt I have mentioned and have
yet to explain,16 the proposition that the merely relative
constraint of adjudication leaves law quite able to perform that
function, too.
IV. "CONSTRAINT" OF ADJUDICATION: PREDICTIVE,
MOTIVATIONAL, OR WHAT?
So far, I have been probing one of three key terms in
Winter's claim that the relative constraint of judicial
decisionmaking leaves law fully capable of performing the work
we expect of law. I have been asking what Winter might
understand by "the work we expect of law." I next want to raise
the question of what he means by speaking of adjudication as
being more or less "constrained." (In case you are wondering,
the third key term I have in mind is "law," for there is a fair
question about what Winter is referring to when he speaks of
something called "law" that might or might not succeed in
doing certain work. I will come to that at the end of these
observations.'7 )
There are a number of differing ways in which we may
understand the notion of "constraint" of adjudication. Here I
will distinguish among the three major senses of predictive (or
causal) constraint, normative constraint, and motivational
constraint. When I speak of adjudication being more or less
constrained in one or another of these senses, I mean
adjudication society-wide, as a whole practice or institution,
and not just some individual instance. In all cases, constraint
is a matter of degree.
Adjudication, then, is predictively constrained in the
degree to which we expect decisions made by sundry judges
confronting the same case or question to converge upon the
same result or upon a set of results that vary only within
known and practically tolerable limits. Expectation here
reflects belief about causation. Insofar as we may believe
adjudicative outcomes to be products of biological and
sociological causes beyond the immediate, personal and
voluntary control of any given adjudicator, and we may further
16 See infra Part V.
17 See infra Part VIII.
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believe these causes to be similar for all adjudicators, we will
believe adjudication to be predictively constrained. Note that
predictive constraint, while thus a matter of what we believe
about the causal environment of judicial decisions, is also an
empirical matter. One's belief in its existence can, after all, be
tested against the hard facts.
Next, normative constraint. You hold adjudication to be
normatively constrained if and only if you hold the following
two propositions to be true. First, for any given case there is a
right or best adjudicative act or decision, or perhaps a small,
select set of those that are indistinguishably right or best.
Second, to the extent that adjudicators fail to make these right
or best decisions, they fail to act well, or as they ought, or as
they would have to act in order to meet our reasons for setting
them up to act at all and then for heeding the actions they
take. In other words, normative constraint is the idea that the
moral justification of our concession of special powers to judges,
to direct state coercion against losing parties to lawsuits,
depends on the results judges reach and not just on the
procedures they follow, or on the people's willingness to abide
by the outcomes of those procedures whatever they are.18 Note
that normative constraint is a non-empirical, strictly
theoretical matter. Your belief in the existence or non-existence
of its twin premises-the existence of right answers and the
judicial obligation to seek them-cannot be tested against any
hard facts.
We come then to motivational constraint. This is the
empiricized version of normative constraint. You will hold
adjudication to be motivationally constrained in the degree to
which you believe that judges, as a matter of fact, believe the
twin premises of normative constraint to be true and that the
judges feel impelled, therefore, to strive impartially to attain
1' The idea of normative constraint does not, however, in itself imply any
particular theory of rightness in result. In particular, it does not equate "right" or
"best" with anything like transcendently fair or just. Whoever, for example, believes
that judges earn their suppers and their stripes by and only by striving toward
outcomes that are wealth maximizing, believes adjudication to be normatively
constrained. Indeed "best" and "right," here, can mean just about anything- consonant
with Rawlsian justice, wealth-maximizing, most conducive to community survival and
success, linguistically most apt or most plausible to the mass or dominant part of some
population, most congruent in result with the outlooks or value-orderings of the mass
or dominant part of some population.
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the best answers. Like causal or predictive constraint, and
unlike normative constraint, motivational constraint is an
empirical, not a theoretical matter. You can test your belief in
its existence against the hard facts-assuming you can find
them out, which in principle you can-about what judges
subjectively are trying to do.
In other words, adjudication can be motivationally
constrained as long as judges merely believe the twin premises
to be true, whereas those premises really must be true in order
for adjudication to be normatively constrained. In that sense-
it being always something of a challenge for moderns to get a
firm grasp on what it might mean for moral premises "really"
to be true1 -- motivational constraint may appear to be the
"weaker" of the two conceptions. But suppose you are one who
easily accepts the truth of the twin premises. For you, then,
motivational constraint may be the stronger, more demanding
conception. To believe in its existence, you would have to
swallow what may strike you as highly dubious speculations
about the beliefs and motivations of judges.
I am now in a position to suggest that law cannot
perform its legitimation function unless citizens at large can
have a well-founded belief that adjudication is motivationally
constrained. At least, that would appear to be so according to
an important form of contemporary liberal thought that we
may call "constitutional contractarian." In the constitutional
contractarian view, hope for the moral redemption of the
coercive side of legal ordering rests on the idea that everyone
having a share of official power to say what the law is-judges,
perhaps, above all-will exercise that share in conformance
with an ideal called "public reason." As will appear, public
reason is a particular form of motivational constraint. In what
follows, my questions will be: (1) whether a widespread, well-
founded belief in the actual prevalence of the constraint of
adjudication by public reason could coexist with a widespread
perception that adjudication is, from a predictive standpoint,
only relatively and not totally constrained; and (2) whether
Winter's account of the cognitive-scientific grounds for belief in
relative predictive constraint of adjudication provides any
9 See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Objectivity and Truth: You'd Better Believe It, 25
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 87 (1996); Michael Moore, Moral Reality, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 1061.
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warrant for belief that adjudication also is conducted under the
motivational constraint of public reason.
V. RECIPROCITY AND PUBLIC REASON IN CONSTITUTIONAL
CONTRACTARIAN THOUGHT
Liberals are individualists at heart.20 Accordingly, they
want to know how it possibly can be right for members of
society to mobilize force or the threat of force (this is what
positive legal ordering does) as a way to bring a population of
presumptively free and equal individuals into "average
compliance" with various laws and regulatory regimes that
none of them ever individually chose and many do not now
21approve. Supposing your country's positive lawmaking system
to be (roughly) a democratic one, the challenge is to explain
how "citizens [may] by their vote properly exercise.., coercive
political power over one another."22 The difficulty lies in
explaining how your or my exercises of political power may be
rendered "justifiable to others as free and equal.'r
According to a "liberal principle of legitimacy"
propounded by John Rawls, the answer lies in submitting our
exercises of political power to the dictates of a certain kind of
law-a constitution or what I elsewhere have called a "law of
20 1 mean individualists, not "atomists." See FRANK I. MICHELIAN, BRENNAN
AND DEMOCRACY 11-14, 65-67 (1999). And I mean normative, not ethical,
individualism. The latter distinction is implicit in Charles Larmore's important essay,
The Moral Basis of Political Liberalism, 96 J. PHIL. 599 (1999). In Larmore's account,
political liberalism, in a post-Romantic age, cuts its ties to any and all substantive
views about "the ends of life," most particularly views that make the value of an act or
course of conduct depend entirely on its having expressly chosen by an individual upon
his or her own "critical reflection," and not because of its fit with any unchosen
"sentiment of belonging." Id. at 603-05, 623. But as Larmore further explains, what
has required this retrenchment of liberalism from that sort of romantic-individualist
ethics is liberalism's own, historic, core commitment to a normative principle of
"respect for persons," corresponding to which is recognition of every individual's right
"to be bound only by principles whose justification he can rationally accept." Id. at 607,
621. "Respect for persons," Larmore neatly writes, "lies at the heart of political
liberalism, not because looking for common ground we find it there, but because it is
what impels us to look for common ground at all." Id. at 608.
For "average compliance" see Jfirgen Habermas, Between Facts and
Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy 448 (William Rehg
trans., MIT Press ed. 1996) (1992).
JoHN RAWLs, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 217 (Columbia University Press 1996)
(1993).
, Id.
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lawmaking' -- that all can endorse "in the light of principles
and ideals acceptable to them as reasonable and rational.'
The moral strategy here is "procedural" in a salient,
contemporary use of that term, the aptness of which will soon
become apparent.26 At its core stands an uncompromising,
ultimate moral concern with the freedom and equality of
individuals taken severally but regarded universally as free
and equal.27 Hence the demand that potentially coercive
political acts be acceptable from the standpoints of each (not
"all," in some collectivized sense of "all") of countless persons
among whom rational conflicts of interest and vision abound.
Acceptable, that is, in principle. Acceptable hypothetically, in
all reason; acceptable in the sight of whoever applies the test of
acceptability.
In Rawls's formulation, political coercion is justified
when it is exercised in support of laws issuing from a known
constitutional regime (the significance of "known" will become
apparent), as long as all may be expected to endorse this, and
assuming everyone to be not only rationally self-interested but
also "reasonable." "Reasonable" here means three things. First,
a reasonable person accepts the inevitability of positive legal
ordering. She doesn't pretend we somehow are going to get
along without lawmakers making laws, and judges resolving
their meanings-in-application, that have to bind everyone
regardless of who likes or approves each law or each
application and who does not. Second, a reasonable person
accepts the fact of deep and enduring conflicts of interests and
ethical visions within her society-what Rawls calls the fact of
reasonable pluralism. 8 Third, she is imbued with the liberal
spirit of reciprocal recognition by persons of each other as
normatively free and equal individuals. A reasonable person
thus stands ready to accept the laws as long as: (a) she sees
everyone else generally supporting and complying with them;
24 See MICHELMAN, supra note 20, at 6.
RAWLS, supra note 22, at 217.
26 For further discussion of proceduralism in constitutional thought, see Frank
I. Michelman, Human Rights and the Limits of Constitutional Theory, 13 RATIO JURIS
63 (2000); Frank I. Michelman, Postmodernism, Proceduralism, and Constitutional
Justice: a Comment on van der Walt & Botha __ CONSTELLATIONS - (forthcoming
2002) [hereinafter Constitutional Justice].
27 See supra note 19.
28 See RAWLS, supra note 22, at 36-37.
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and (b) she sees how these laws merit mutual acceptance by a
competently reasoning group of persons, all of whom desire,
and suppose each other to desire, to devise and abide by laws
reflecting fair terms of social cooperation in conditions of deep
and enduring but reasonable ethical disagreements and
conflicts of interests among free and equal persons."
But wait a minute. No matter how reasonable we ask
each other to be, surely none of us really expects that every
discrete act of lawmaking could pass such a test of rational
acceptability to every supposedly reasonable, self-respecting
inhabitant of a modern, plural society. Realistically, our hope
must be more modest, more "procedural." Our hope is that an
aptly designed general system or regime for lawmaking-or call
it a constitution-might be able to pass such a test. Maybe we
can imagine some such regime, about which we would be
prepared to say that it ought to be found acceptable, as a
regime, by every rational and reasonable person. If so, then we
might further maintain that the rational acceptability to you,
as reasonable, of the constitutional regime commits you to
accept whatever specific laws may issue from the regime."
That, after all, would appear to be exactly the point of Rawls's
claim, in his "liberal principle of legitimacy," that exercises of
political coercion are justifiable insofar as they issue from "a
constitution, the essentials of which all citizens may be
expected to endorse."3
We may now introduce the idea of a sufficient,
legitimating constitutional agreement.32 Four terms compose
this idea, as follows:
2See id. at xliv, xlvi, 226-27; John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,
in COLLECTED PAPERS 573, 576-79, 581, 605-06 (Samuel Freeman ed., 1999)
[hereinafter Rawls, Public Reason Revisited].
30 See Samuel Freeman, Original Meaning, Democratic Interpretation, and the
Constitution, 21 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3 (1992), cited approvingly by RAWLS, supra note
22, at 234 n.19. Cf JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 195-201 (1993) (on "the four-
stage sequence"). This means that your finding particular ordinary laws unjust gives
you no ground for resort to unlawful force, not that it gives you no ground for
denunciation, civil disobedience, or conscientious refusal.
31 Rawls, supra note 22, at 217.
32 I develop and examine this idea at greater length in Frank I. Michelman,
The Problem of Constitutional Interpretive Disagreement: Can "Discourses of
Application" Help?, in HABERMAS AND PRAGMATISM (M. Aboulafia & C. Kemp eds.,
forthcoming 2002); Frank I. Michelman, Social Rights, the Constitution, and Liberal
Political Justification, - ICON _ (forthcoming 2002).
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First, what is supposed to be "legitimated" (in the sense
of justified morally) by this agreement is positive legal
ordering, the coercive exercise of collective power through
lawmaking, by and among citizens considered individually free
and equal.
Second, what is supposed to have the desired
legitimating effect is agreement by each person affected. Not,
however, actual agreement but hypothetical (what some would
call "counterfactual" agreement)-the "acceptability" of the
political practice among persons affected by it, envisioning
those persons not only as rational but also as reasonable.
Third, the legitimating hypothetical agreement is a
constitutional agreement. We do not apply the universal-
reasonable acceptability test to each and every law that crops
up in a country's politics. We rather apply it to the country's
system for lawmaking.
Lastly, then, "sufficiency." In order to meet the test of
rational acceptability to every reasonable person, a lawmaking
system has to include a principle or guarantee affecting every
topic for which a rational person, responding reasonably, would
demand a guarantee as a condition of willing support for the
system as a whole. This minimal set of principles and
guarantees must be extensive enough to compose a system for
political decisionmaking about which every affected,
supposedly reasonable -person rationally can say: "A system
measuring up to these principles and terms-all of them-is
sufficiently regardful of my and everyone's interests and status
as free and equal persons that I ought to support it and its
legislative products, provided everyone else does."
It seems clear that a sufficient, legitimating
constitutional agreement will have to contain some reliable,
substantive assurances regarding what we may as well call
people's rights. At least it will have to guarantee compliance
with what Rawls calls the "central ranges" of certain basic
negative liberties,33 meaning with those obvious applications of
the principles of freedom of thought, conscience, and
expression, for example, that-as cognitive science in Winter's
hands helps to explain-no one in our world respectably could
dispute and few would think of disputing. (For example, an
"See RAWIS, supra note 22, at 295-96.
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outright ban against criticizing the government falls within the
consensual core of constitutionally guaranteed freedom of
expression but a law against expressive flag burning very
possibly does not.') Just as obviously, though, the notional
constitutional agreement must provide some sort of assurance
going beyond that one, because falling outside these highly
consensual "central ranges" are innumerable issues touching
on very sensitive ethical and moral nerves. Think, for example,
of our society's current debates and controversies over
constitutional-legal treatments of affirmative action, the death
penalty, and the right to bear arms. (Once upon a time we
would have had to mention slavery.) Americans cannot know in
advance the official resolutions of such controversies, much less
of the indefinite, unknowable, future stream of comparably
sensitive ones. We lack, so to speak, the corresponding terms of
the notional constitutional agreement, except as from time to
time resolutions are handed to us by law-speaking officials,
mainly the ones we call judges. But how can a notional
constitutional agreement be "sufficient" unto the purposes of
liberal political legitimation35 when at any and every moment it
lacks so much seemingly essential information?
VI. PUBLIC REASON AS MOTIVATIONAL CONSTRAINT
Rawls responds that such an agreement may be
sufficient, depending on the degree of our assurance that
judges and other officials approach their work of resolving the
open questions under the constraint of public reason. In the
last analysis, what that roughly means is that whoever
engages in any exercise of political power respecting such
choices does so through a sincere exercise of judgment
regarding which choice will be truest to some full set of
constitutional principles. It would be a specific set that the
decisionmaker has in mind and stands ready to defend as
based in the spirit of reciprocity, of mutual recognition by
citizens of each other, and regard for each other, as free and
equal persons diversified by a reasonable pluralism of ideas of
4 Cf MARKTUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 106
(1999) (remarking that a nation that enforces law against flag burning would not on
that account be launched on a path towards becoming "Stalinist Russia").
35 See supra notes 20-31 and accompanying text.
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the good.36 If citizens could be confident that public reason in
that sense prevails in public decisionmaking over matters of
basic constitutional import-so runs the line of thought-then
perhaps that confidence, combined with strict guarantees of
everyone's continual enjoyment of the undisputed cores of the
traditional civil liberties and civil rights, could give every
reasonable person a sufficient basis for accepting the
legislative outcomes of a democratic constitutional regime. And
notice, then, the converse of this proposition: If the facts on the
ground are such that citizens cannot reasonably maintain
confidence in the effective constraint of public reason on official
choices affecting matters of basic constitutional import, then
the extant system of positive legal ordering is unjust. It fails to
measure up to the moral demand for justice in politics, as
political-liberal thought conceives of that demand.
Bottom line: The chance for liberal justice rests on a
twofold hope: (1) that citizens can know what they need to
know about not only the uncontested terms-the overt clauses,
as we might say-of an aspirationally sufficient and
legitimating constitutional agreement, but also about the spirit
in which questions of application left open by the clauses will
be addressed by those having the powers of decision; and (2)
that such knowledge can make the constitutional system
"complete" enough to merit universal reasonable acceptance of
the legislative and adjudicative products of the system.
Remember, we already supposedly have the assurance of
adjudicative convergence on those "central ranges" of
application of the standard basic liberties, regarding which we
can posit something close to country-wide, reasonable-and-
rational, substantive agreement. (For the answer to the
question why we can, we may think of how Steven Winter-
and I see him as arm-and-arm on this point with the recent
work of Mark Tushnet 3 7 -argues that facts of neural and
cultural conditioning allow us a fairly confident prediction that
the central ranges will be respected and enforced by judges of
36 See, e.g., RAWLS, supra note 22, at 1-1i; Rawls, Public Reason Revisited, supra
note 29, at 578-79, 581.
1 
7 See Frank I. Michelman, Populist Natural Law (Reflections on Tushnet's
"Thin Constitution"), 34 U. RICH. L. REV. 461, 462-64, 473-75 (2000) (discussing
Tushnet's theory of an "incentive-compatible" and "thin" constitution as presented in
TUSHNET, supra note 34).
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the law, through processes of persuasion carried on in the
public eye among persons who have cared and been able to
attain high judicial office.38) To those assurances, we now hope
to add another: that judges and others exercising law-speaking
powers approach the remaining, open, and controversial
questions of basic-liberties application under firm inspiration
and guidance by the spirit of liberal reciprocity.
We can see how the two types of assurance might be
thought to combine. The "tight" central-ranges guarantee is
relatively strong in decisiveness of application but
correspondingly restricted in scope of application. The "loose"
public-reason guarantee extends to a much wider range of
politically decidable matters, but at the cost of allowing in
much more disagreement about what ought to be done, and
correlative uncertainty about what will be done. The idea, it
seems, is to use the looser guarantee to supplement the tighter
one, in hopes of eking out a total constitutional-legal practice
about which a rational and reasonable person can fairly be
expected to say: "A system that not only contains these stated
principles-these clauses-but that also is bound to these
discursive expectations is sufficiently regardful of my and
everyone's interests and status as free and equal persons that I
ought to support it and its legislative products, provided
everyone else does."
But of course there's the rub. The wishful "ideal" of
public reason cannot play its intended role in liberal political
justification unless it really does generate an actual constraint
of public reason." That it does so must furthermore be a matter
of knowledge among citizens. Allowing that citizens do not have
to know exhctly how every judge will answer every debatable
constitutional-legal question that will materialize over the
future course of history, they do have to know at every moment
that a certain, settled set of reciprocity-tending aims and
values will guide and constrain decisions. Thus there will have
to be some underlying social agreement on the substance-or
call it if you want, the spirit-of the guiding aims and values.
The puzzle is how we can posit the requisite background
agreement without denying or obfuscating the supposed social
3" See, e.g., CLEARING, supra note 1, at 152, 321, 331.
9 See Rawls, Public Reason Revisited, supra note 29, at 576.
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fact of deep ethical diversity that it is the business of this kind
of legitimation theory not to obfuscate but to overcome.
40
VII. A COGNITIVE SCIENCE OF PUBLIC REASON? (COLLAPSING
THE "PREDICTIVE" "MOTIVATIONAL" DISTINCTION)
It seems at this point that the hope for political
legitimacy, as political liberals conceive it, ultimately rests on
three propositions: first, that a country's people retain a shared
commitment to liberal reciprocity, however otherwise ethically
divided they may be; second, that we can eke out a sufficient,
legitimating constitutional agreement, given secure knowledge
that our judges are motivationally constrained not only to
vindicate the consensual cores of the constitutional clauses on
basic civil liberties and civil rights, but to keep their
resolutions of the open questions-of extension, interpretation,
application-within the bounds of what reciprocity can
countenance; and, of course, third, that we can and do know
that judges truly will strive to do exactly that.
But how, exactly, can we hope to "know" the unwritten
terms or spirit in which constitutional-interpretative questions
are being addressed, and will be, by those having the power to
decide them? After all, even for Rawls the ideal of public reason
seems often to figure as a strictly counterfactual, normative
ideal, and one that is potentially highly critical of actual
political practice anywhere on earth."' His point, then, is that if
the ideal of public reason is not, in fact, sufficiently realized in
a given society's actual practice, then the liberal principle of
legitimacy will not be met in that society, and exercises of
coercive political power will not, then, in that society, be
morally supportable.
But Rawls also explains public reason as what he calls a
"realistically utopian" idea. He means that the actual history of
constitutional-democratic countries, combined with reasonable
psychological and sociological speculation, gives a basis for
belief that the public-reason ideal can be realized adequately in
practice, "taking men as they are and laws [as] they might
40 For fuller discussion, see Constitutional Justice, supra note 26.
41 See, e.g., RAWLS, supra note 22, at 213.
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be." 2 We have, Rawls argues, a strong enough basis for belief
in this possibility to make constitutional justice the best
approach to the pursuit of political justice, at least for a society
whose dominant political culture already falls generally within
the constitutional democratic tradition.
One can hardly help wondering what cognitive science
in Winter's hands might have to say about an empirical
speculation of that kind. Can the science, perhaps, by a kind of
merger of causal-predictive and motivational constraint,
underwrite the likelihood of the requisite convergence of
constitutional adjudicators on decisions more or less
guaranteed to keep within the bounds of what reciprocity can
countenance? Keep in mind that these constitutional
adjudicators are people engaged among themselves in
processes of persuasion, and under pressure of public opinion of
which persons who rise to high public office can hardly be
unconscious or uncaring.43
Winter's current book does attempt an answer. It does
not concern itself much at all with normative questions. But it
is not entirely silent, either. It says at least this much:
The insight that law is a socially contingent artifact ... implies that
legal meaning is possible only to the extent that the society enjoys a
relative stability of context: When there is a consensus in practices
and consequent values ... then the courts will be able to articulate
"principled" decisions that people will recognize as valid .... But
when social practices and values are controversial or in disarray, the
legal rules and principles will be too. It follows that we cannot expect
the law to resolve difficult, controversial cases in a way that is
different or removed from the realm of politics.44
If we take that at face value, then is Winter in the
posture of destroying the hope reposed by political liberals in
public reason? The "relative" predictive constraint of
adjudication expected by cognitive science apparently will fail
just at the point where adjudication meets up with the
ethically "difficult and controversial" cases that are the focal
concern of the political-liberal theory of political legitimation
42 See John Rawls, The Law of Peoples 11-13 (1999) (quoting Jean-Jacques
Rousseau, The Social Contract (Maurice Cranston trans., 1968) (1762)).
43 See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
"CLEARING, supra note 1, at 328-29.
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through constitutional law. Law, then, in short, apparently will
not be able to "do the one thing [liberals] most want to depend
on it for."5 If that indeed is the meaning, then, combining it
with the claim that an adjudicative process that is only
relatively constrained can nevertheless support "the work we
expect of law," we get either negative message number one or
negative message number two:46 either political legitimation, at
least as political liberals conceive it, is not worth worrying
about, or it is worth worrying about but law obviously cannot
be its vehicle.
And yet what has not yet been explored, as far as I can
see, is the possibility of the positive message. The question
would be whether cognitive science might underwrite a
sufficient expectation of actual judicial convergence on the
reciprocal-recognition norm (or something like or akin to it) to
support a political-liberal theory of political legitimation
through constitutional law applied under constraint of public
reason. Cognitive science obviously is deployed by Winter as
the guarantor of enough societal "consensus in practices and
consequent values" to support enough motivational and
predictive constraint to contribute usefully toward the stability
and settlement aims that society holds out for law. Why not
legitimation, too?
Nailing down an answer to that question lies beyond the
scope of this preliminary inquiry, but we can list some
possibilities in quick review. One seemingly plausible, but by
no means self-evident, response would be substantive. Perhaps
cognitive science tells us that the actual neural/cultural
inheritance of humankind, or of humankind in our part of the
world, simply does not jibe with the particular sort of
constraint on adjudication that we've seen to be required by the
"liberal principle of legitimacy,4 7 that is, one that sounds in the
liberal criterion of reciprocity. (Sociobiology, this may be your
cue.)
Now consider a second sort of answer. Time and again,
Winter mentions that a cognitive-scientific account of the
relative constraint of adjudication (predictive) is tantamount to
45 Id. at 163.
46 See supra text following note 14.
47 See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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a prediction that adjudicators will converge on those "values
and perspectives" that happen to be dominantly "socially
shared"48 in a society's "most conventional' cultural precincts.4 9
As Winter presents it, the dark side of the coin of relative
constraint of adjudication (predictive) is that "law... always..
. enforces.., the dominant normative views of the culture."
0
But in fact he does not say "dark" or anything like it, and there
is no apparent reason why we should imagine him thinking
any such thing. Jiirgen Habermas might,5' but that is because
Habermas takes moral universalism very seriously indeed.52 By
contrast, there is no sign that Steven Winter takes it seriously
at all. Nor is there any self-evident reason why the Rawlsian
"liberal principle of legitimacy" should not avail itself of the
lucky contingency, wherever it might be found to exist, of
widespread popular sympathy for the liberal ideal of
reciprocity. As Rawls himself explains, his constitutional-
contractarian response to the problem of political legitimacy
has been specifically shaped to societies already imagined as
falling with a certain broad, historical tradition of political
sensibility." It has, he says, been "constructed" or "worked out"
from ideal elements---"fundamental ideas"--drawn from "the
most deep-seated convictions and traditions of a modern
democratic state."4
We come, then, to a third possible objection to
summoning cognitive science h la Winter to the support of a
Rawlsian hypothesis of a "realistic utopia" of public reason." It
would be that the very idea disastrously confuses motivational
48 CLEARING, supra note 1, at 318.
41 Id. at 323; see id. at 321 (suggesting the likelihood of subordination of the
"personal preferences" of individual judges to "some larger set of values shared by the
wider audience").
Id. at 331.
See, e.g., HABEIMAS, supra note 21, at 200, 209 (stating that "In a pluralistic
society in which various belief systems compete with each other,. .. [w]hat counts for
one person as a historically proven topos is for others ideology or sheer prejudice ...
Mhe practice of interpretation requires a point of reference beyond settled legal
traditions."); id. at 223 (a "suspicion of ideology" hangs over every claim of a
universally shared "background understanding").
52 See Frank I. Michehnan, Morality, Identity, and 'Constitutional Patriotism",
14 RATIO JURIS 253, 256, 258, 262 (2001).
3See, e.g., RAWLS, supra note 22, at xl-xli; cf Rawls, Public Reason Revisited,
supra note 29, at 573-74.
RAWLS, supra note 22, at 13-14, 300-01.
"See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
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with predictive constraint. In Rawls's hands, the ideal of public
reason seems always to refer to the subjective state of whoever
is in a position of wielding power to say what the law is. It
means that person's sincere readiness to explain her decision
as true to some full set of constitutional principles that she has
in mind and stands ready to defend as based in the spirit of
liberal reciprocity. That is how conscientious, liberal-minded
citizens and officials carry out what Rawls calls their duties of
"civility." 6 By contrast, the whole tendency of Winter's line of
cognitive-scientific argumentation leans toward the
displacement (or transformation) of conscious agency by (or
into) behind-the-back causality-or, in other words, the
transformation of what I have called motivational into what I
have called predictive constraint.57
Does Rawlsian liberal legitimacy, then, really depend on
the conscious motivations of decisionmakers being what they
morally ought to be, regardless of any level of confidence we
may have that decisionmakers will be biologically and
sociologically caused to act "as if' thus consciously motivated?
Why should it? It is one thing to ask in what spirit faithful
liberals consciously will consider their choices when deploying
their shares of power to say what the law is or shall be. To that
question the "ideal" of public reason gives the answer. It would
seem, though, to be quite another thing to ask what citizens at
large must know about the manner in which judges will decide
hard cases in order to find the legal order deserving of their
respect and support. To that end, why should it not be enough
for citizens to have assurance that the judges will act as if
consciously actuated by the ideal of public reason, thus under
the "constraint" of public reason-or as Rawls likes to put it,
according to the "idea" (even if not the "ideal") of public
reason? 8 And is not that just the sort of assurance that
cognitive-science A la Winter might be in a position to offer?
5See, e.g., Rawls, Public Reason Revisited, supra note 29, at 578, 581.
67 See supra Part IV.
"See Rawls, Public Reason Revisited, supra note 29, at 574-76.
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Or is the last word here to be that of Justice Holmes?. 9
It is not, after all, beyond consideration that the difference
between a citizen's sense of having been accidentally tripped
over and her sense of having been intentionally kicked is what
finally makes the difference between legitimate and
illegitimate legal ordering. If it does, then liberal legitimacy
really does depend on citizens being able to know that judges
are motivationally--consciously-constrained by the ideal of
public reason. Rawls himself, to my reading, leaves the
question exquisitely unresolved.0
VIII. THE NEGATION OF "THE LEGAL MATERIALS"
The deep and ultimate claim of Winter's book may be
markedly more radical than what appears on its face. As I have
mentioned, Clearing apparently shares with virtually all
jurisprudence the perception that it is at the point of
adjudication-the point at which social controversies are
submitted for ostensible decision according to law-that the
pretensions of legal ordering to do work for society are put to
the test. Adjudication means the business of deciding cases
according to what Winter sometimes refers to as "the legal
materials."6' It means adjudicators having resort to such rules,
w See Dairy Road Partners v. Island Ins. Co., 992 P.2d 93, 115 (Haw. 2000)
("The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the trial court, quoting Professors Prosser
and Keeton for the proposition that 'the distinction between intentional and
unintentional invasions draws a bright line of separation among shadings of almost
infinitely varied human experiences.... As [Justice Oliver Wendell] Holmes observed,
even a dog knows the difference between being tripped over and being kicked.'
[American Nat'l Fire Ins. Co. v. Schuss, 607 A.2d 418 (Conn. 1992)] at 422 (quoting
W.P. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 8 (5th ed. 1984).").
Rawls, Public Reason Revisited, supra note 29, at 578:
[Wihen, on a constitutional essential or matter of basic justice, all
appropriate government officials act from and follow public reason,
and when all reasonable citizens think of themselves ideally as if they
were legislators following public reason, the legal enactment
expressing the opinion of the majority is legitimate law. It may not be
thought the most reasonable, or the most appropriate, by each, but it
is politically (morally) binding on him or her as a citizen and is to be
accepted as such. Each thinks that all have spoken and voted at least
reasonably, and therefore all have followed public reason and honored
their duty of civility.
Id.
s See, e.g., CLEARING, supra note 1, at 316 (quoted at the outset of this essay).
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standards, and principles as they feel able to draw from
statutes, judicial precedents, and any other propositional
products or aspects of their country's history that may in their
minds qualify as legal. It is that more or less distinctly
pedigreed collection of normative propositional stuff, together
with the adjudicative uses to which it professedly is put, to
which Winter apparently refers when he speaks of something
called "law" that might or might not succeed in accomplishing
the work we expect of law.
But immediately one feels the urge to qualify. Without a
doubt, Winter's book slips into the sort of positive-ish talk I
have just been describing, about law as a distinct and
demarcated body of normative propositional stuff. It is,
however, hard to suppress the thought that Winter's talk in
this vein is maintained provisionally, for the sake of effective
communication with his intended professional audience in its
present, imperfect state of understanding of where the real
truth lies. For good and understandable reason, Winter
frequently talks the talk of a positivist notion of law, but one
cannot be so sure that he, in the bottom of his heart, means to
walk the walk. Ostensibly, Winter's claim is that "the legal
materials" provide sufficient predictive determinacy of
adjudicative outcomes, at least when filtered through
"processes of persuasion" among biologically and sociologically
pre-conditioned judges, to do the work we expect of law.
Ultimately, though, Winter may intend a more radical
claim, one that finally would kick aside any notion of a socially
cognizable body of distinctively "legal" propositional stuff. The
claim then would be that officials acting in the role of judges, in
the sorts of social settings we currently know as adjudicative,
commonly pre-conditioned as they are and responding as they
must to entrenched public opinion, predictably would converge
on a sufficiently-if only "relatively"-constrained range of
outcomes to accomplish successfully the work we expect of law,
even if their persuasive processes were to pay no particular
attention to any particularly "legal" body of normative
propositional stuff. I am suggesting the possibility that
Winter's deeper conviction is that we don't need "law" at all, in
the positivist, stuff-y sense conveyed by a phrase like "the legal
materials," in order for judicial institutions to carry out
successfully the work we expect of law. The institutional
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arrangements, settings, and practices, then, would be the
crucial factor while "the law"-the legal "materials"--would be
but an epiphenomenal effect of the institutions, an aura
surrounding them.
Now it is fairly easy, under Steven Winter's sterling
tutelage, to imagine law's work thus being done, assuming that
work to be confined to stability and settlement. But to suggest
that legitimation, too, might thus be accomplished would be
utterly transformative for political-liberal thought. It would be
to leave behind the "liberal principle of legitimacy"-the theory
of legitimation through the notional idea of a sufficient,
legitimating, hypothetical-contractual body of constitutional
law (to be applied, to be sure, under constraint of public
reason)-for something else; not something utterly unrelated,
but something very different. It would be to carry one giant
step further the process of the proceduralization of normative,
liberal legal thought.

